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Last Updated: Aug 07, 2008 03:30 PM
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Tuesday - April 13, 2004 at 03:37 AM inTwo Ways to Win
I'm not an expert on Iraq. Not by any stretch of the imagination. Despite this complete lack of knowledge or background, I'm going to hazard some guesses as to what 95% of Iraqis want:
* Her biggest concern is making sure that she and her family are safe and have the necessities of life. I'm using the feminine because I'm assuming (again, I have no actual knowledge here) that women hold a slight demographic edge in Iraq due to this and previous conflicts, which tend to disproportionately kill men. * She has a lot to gain from political and economic stability. She has even more to gain if she has some sort of voice in the resulting government, but simple stability is most important right now. * She cares about what happens to Iraq as a whole, but that concern is far behind her concern about the survival and well-being of herself, her family, her friends, and whatever other social and ethnic groups she feels she is a part of. All this is good for the United States, since this hypothetical typical Iraqi probably views our presence as a good thing, a force for stability and (eventual) peace and prosperity. She isn't going to be taking potshots at our troops, or booby-trapping roads. There's only one problem: The typical Iraqi is not going to actively oppose the insurgents, either. When your primary goal is survival and safety, you don't risk your neck for an abstract good. You keep your head down, and let the other folks play soldier. These people are simply not players in the political or military landscape of Iraq. Who's Shooting At Us? Also, without any particular expertise or knowledge, I'm going to hazard some guesses as to what motivates the insurgents: * The typical insurgent probably sees more advantage to opposing the U.S. than working with the occupation. This advantage might be political (being part of a soon-to-be-powerful group), social (sticking with his clan), or spiritual (72 virgins), or something else entirely. * He thinks there is a good chance that either the U.S. will leave Iraq soon, or that his group will become powerful enough that it will have to be given a seat at the table in a future Iraqi government. Either way, there's a good chance he can avoid being punished for his part in the insurgency (assuming he survives). In short, there's an old-fashioned power struggle going on, as certain factions try to bully their way to a seat at the ruling table before the American start turning things back over to Iraqis. Fundamentally, the fact that 95% of the population just wants the shooting to stop doesn't matter. That 95% will support--or at least not actively oppose--any government which brings some measure of stability to the country. They are, in effect, ballast. 95% of the population in any country, including America, is ballast, and won't take life-and-death risks unless there's no other choice. The people who matter are the 5% who are willing to take big risks for some potential benefit. The insurgents belong to this group, as do the members of the ruling council. Two Ways to Win If the population of Iraq is like most places, 95% ballast and 5% ambitious risk-takers, there are two ways to win: 1) Co-opt the ambitious risk takers and neutralize those who won't be co-opted. 2) Bring the other 95% of the population into play. Our system is so stable in America in large part because the route to power and fame is through winning the hearts or wallets of a goodly chunk of the ballast. In this country, you can't rise to power by killing people or trying to bring down our democratic institutions. So the energy of the ambitious is channelled into positive, constructive efforts. In Iraq, however, it is just as easy (perhaps easier) to win through violence and destruction--just look at how quickly al-Sadr has become an important player. At the same time, there are not a lot of routes to fame and glory to be had in working with the Americans. Paul Bremer pretty much runs the show, and while there's continuing talk of replacing him with some sort of Iraqi authority, it isn't really clear how those people will be chosen or who will win. And the other 95% of the population just keeps their heads down and tries not to get shot. Posted at 03:37 AM | Permalink | | | |